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ABSTRACT 
Due to increased complexity, scale, and functionality of 
information and telecommunication (IT) infrastructures, 
every day new exploits and vulnerabilities are discovered. 
These vulnerabilities are most of the time used by ma-
licious people to penetrate these IT infrastructures for 
mainly disrupting business or stealing intellectual pro-
perties. Current incidents prove that it is not sufficient 
anymore to perform manual security tests of the IT infra-
structure based on sporadic security audits. Instead net-
works should be continuously tested against possible 
attacks. In this paper we present current results and 
challenges towards realizing automated and scalable 
solutions to identify possible attack scenarios in an IT in-
frastructure. Namely, we define an extensible framework 
which uses public vulnerability databases to identify pro-
bable multi-step attacks in an IT infrastructure, and pro-
vide recommendations in the form of patching strategies, 
topology changes, and configuration updates. 
KEYWORDS: Multi-step attacks, attack graphs, 
vulnerability databases, security simulation, risk manage-
ment.   
1. INTRODUCTION 
Increased use of information and telecommunication 
infrastructures (IT) for monitoring and controlling critical 
infrastructures of modern societies mandates us to devote 
special attention on their security. Due to increased com-
plexity, scale, and functionality, new vulnerabilities are 
discovered almost every day. These vulnerabilities are 
exploited by malicious people to penetrate the IT infra-
structures for mainly disrupting business or stealing 
intellectual properties. This problem is intensified by 
modern attacks on the IT infrastructures, as represented 
by Stuxnet which combines several mechanisms to ex-
ploit vulnerabilities in a range of operating systems in-
cluding industrial infrastructures [1], [2]. Stuxnet em-
ploys several steps in order to infiltrate parts of the net-
worked infrastructure and in doing so gives way for new 
attack scenarios that previously might have been consi-
dered unlikely.  
Cyber espionage and cyber warfare are considered to be 
two of the most important threats for IT infrastructures. 
Cyber espionage involves theft of intellectual properties 
and knowledge of a company or an institute. Attackers 
make use of vulnerabilities in an IT infrastructure to 
transfer large scale datasets to another location within a 
short time window without being detected [3]. Cyber 
warfare is another important threat mostly targeting criti-
cal infrastructures of modern societies. Everyday more 
such systems get interconnected. This trend changes the 
characteristics of military offences between countries or 
terrorist activities as in the example of the denial of ser-
vice attack on Estonia [4].  
The main challenge in analysis and identification of these 
threats is the asynchronous nature of the problem. For an 
attacker, it is sufficient to find a low cost attack scenario, 
while the defender has to identify all probable attack 
scenarios. The latter requires continuous analyses for 
vulnerabilities on all network nodes for the whole appli-
cation inventory. Network security testing should not 
interrupt the daily business activities of an organization. 
Therefore it should be done in a virtual environment with 
simulation and distributed computation capabilities. An-
other drawback is the dimension of the problem which 
can be quite large due to a large number of vulnerabilities 
and exploits, firewall rules, address translations, proxies, 
interdependencies, intrusion detection rules, and the be-
havior of the clients. Even in a small scale networks with 
tens of nodes, the problem can become quite unmana-
geable. Additionally, standard vulnerability scanners are 
unable to determine all possible multi-step attacks, as 
they only provide analysis on a per node basis. Under 
these circumstances it is quite challenging to come up 
with an attack scenario that can test the security of the 
target network thoroughly. Moreover, the concurrent 
patching of all related vulnerabilities may not be feasible 
due to unavailability of patches, or due to application 
dependencies and operational constraints. 
Due to the complexity, scale, and dynamic nature of the 
problem, it is not sufficient anymore to perform manual 
security analysis of an IT infrastructure based on sporadic 
security audits. Instead networks should be continuously 
tested against possible multi-step attacks. Automated and 
scalable security test solutions need to be developed so 
that security administrators can be warned against pos-
sible penetration points along with the associated risk 
values in their infrastructures. In addition, they can be 
supported with recommendations to mitigate these threats.  
Recommendations, such as patching strategies, topology 
changes, and configuration updates, can be useful to re-
duce IT related risks in the infrastructure.  
There exist various activities [6], [7], [8] which address 
subsets of these issues, but, up to our knowledge, there is 
no unified open source solution. Existing solutions usual-
ly address a specific problem, such as vulnerability 
scanning, patch management, and IT security manage-
ment.  Moreover, existing vulnerability assessment tools 
(such as nessus, saint, openVAS, retine, GFI Languard) 
or GRCM (governance, risk and compliance management) 
are only useful for manual and sporadic security audits, 
and cannot analyze and identify multi-step attacks in 
large scale IT infrastructures. 
In this paper we outline an open source software frame-
work for automated security testing by using public 
vulnerability and exploit databases. Our framework pro-
vides unified testing opportunities with modules for in-
formation extraction, attack analysis, risk management, 
security recommendation, and security simulation. The 
framework is based on a multi-agent system. Therefore it 
can scale and permits the integration of new func-
tionalities and data sources. We envision that the open 
source framework will be used by IT managers without 
releasing valuable information to external parties. Secu-
rity audit companies usually scan an IT infrastructure 
once with very limited knowledge due to privacy and on 
a per node bases. Therefore they may not test the in-
frastructure thoroughly and may fail to cover all possible 
penetration points. Our unified solution can be used by IT 
specialists within and under control of the organization 
itself. It can provide a secure distributed platform to 
collaboratively analyze interdependent infrastructures 
belonging different administrative domains. As the result, 
the security of the IT infrastructure will be scored; iden-
tified weaknesses will be reported, and recommendations 
in terms of patching, configuration, and topology changes 
will be generated. These recommendations will be tested 
in the simulation component over up-to-date network and 
services settings, and finally mitigation steps may be 
taken to remove the important weaknesses. 
Organization of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we 
introduce our framework and describe its components. In 
Sections 3 to 8, we review current research and deve-
lopment results to realize these components, and identify 
open problems to be addressed. Some final remarks in 
Section 9 conclude the paper.  
2. AUTOMATED IT SECURITY TESTING 
FRAMEWORK AND ITS COMPONENTS 
We propose a scalable and extensible framework inter-
connected with real network where attack analysis, risk 
analysis, and testing of mitigation strategies can be per-
formed continuously. Figure 1 depicts our framework, its 
components, and their relations. Our automated security 
testing framework contains six basic components. 
Our view of IT security test consists of identifying pos-
sible attack paths reflecting probable multi-step attack 
vectors within an IT infrastructure. This can be achieved 
with the help of an ontological approach reflecting device 
vulnerabilities, possible exploits, and the associated mul-
ti-step attacks. The knowledge component includes onto-
logies tailored for the vulnerability and threat domain. 
Knowledge repositories constructed using these onto-
logies can be populated by using the information extrac-
ted and enriched from public free-text vulnerability and 
threat databases as well as from data sources of target IT 
infrastructures, such as software inventory, topology, 
configuration, security policies, and firewall rules. Vulne-
rability and threat databases contain large number of 
unstructured free-text entries (NVD - National Vulne-
rability Databases, OSVD - Open Source Vulnerability 
Database, CVE – Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, 
CPE – Common Platform Enumeration, CWE – Common 
Weakness Enumeration, etc.) 1 which usually need to be 
processed manually by security experts. Automatic or se-
mi-automatic information extraction methods are requi-
red for populating ontologies designed for vulnerabilities 
and exploits.  
 
Figure 1: Automated IT Security testing framework 
With our framework, we would like to associate existing 
vulnerabilities and exploits with the network elements, 
servers, clients, applications, and services. Then, we will 
identify multi-step attacks by using distributed analysis 
techniques to decide IP, transport, or application level 
connectivity through gateways with firewall, and proxy 
capabilities. Scalability is one of the key points, since 
checking 45.000 vulnerabilities along with hundreds of 
firewall and IDS rules for even small scale networks are 
infeasible with existing approaches. The multi-step at-
tack analysis component includes distributed accessi-
bility analysis, multi-step attack analysis, and risk assess-
ment functionalities. This component associates vulnera-
bility knowledge to IT infrastructure elements based on 
their properties and capabilities (operating system, proto-
cols, applications, services, patch levels, etc.). Distributed 
accessibility analysis processes firewall, proxy, access 
filter, address translation, and virtual private network 
rules and policies to decide which compromised node 
permits access to which other nodes. Multi-step attack 
analysis uses accessibility information to enumerate at-
tack paths and reachable attack targets and sources. This 
information together with IT infrastructure specific 
knowledge is used in risk analysis to assess the risks to 
critical IT elements and services.  
The recommendation component generates best mitiga-
tion strategies under user specified constraints with 
respect to the placement of firewall and intrusion detec-
tion devices, patching plan, configuration change, soft-
ware update, and topology change.  
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Assessment of the risk and impact of attack vectors by IT 
managers can be achieved by a novel simulation for 
security and networking capabilities. Our open source si-
mulation framework (NeSSi2)2  [9] operating on JIAC3 [5] 
can handle large-scale network topologies, services, and 
vulnerabilities. The simulation component based on 
NeSSi2 helps assess the impact of multi-step attacks and 
their mitigation strategies over the target IT infrastructure 
and its services. It includes methodologies for risk assess-
ment, visualization, and what-if analysis. 
The use of distributed algorithms for attack analysis with-
in our open source multi-agent system JIAC ensures scal-
ability. The multi-agent system is built upon the JIAC 
framework which provides scalability, and seamless 
service deployment and modification. It also enables IT 
security test scenarios which involve inter-dependent IT 
infrastructures which are operated by different admini-
strative domains. 
In the following sections we review and compare existing 
results, and identify open problems towards realizing 
these components. 
3. VULNERABILITY DATABASES 
Publicly available vulnerability databases (such as NVD, 
OSVD, CVE, CPE, CWE) are for human consumption, 
and they are unstructured. Thus, the available information 
is unsuitable for direct machine interpretation, and it 
creates a challenge for automatic security testing.  
The Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language 
(OVAL4) is a community standard which partially ad-
dresses the non-machine readable nature of the current 
vulnerability databases. It defines a machine readable 
language using XML. One problem with OVAL is that 
the test results only indicate the presence of a vulnera-
bility, not its exploitability. To successfully exploit a 
vulnerability a set of pre-conditions has to be fulfilled in 
the attacked IT infrastructure. Examples of these pre-
conditions can be a particular software, the network con-
nectivity, and the attacker’s privilege level. After suc-
cessful exploitation of the vulnerability, the network is 
exposed to a new set of conditions, called post-conditions, 
which can help an attacker to launch new attacks against 
the system. These post-conditions, as pointed out by 
Maggi et al. [10], have a higher layer of abstraction than 
pre-conditions and can be categorized as gained access 
(e.g. guest, user, root, etc…), read, write, execute, corrupt, 
exhaust, create, delete, crash, reboot, disrupt, and deny 
privileges. The partial pre- and post-conditions of vulne-
rabilities are given as human readable text in the title or 
description sections of an OVAL definition. We focus 
here on the mapping of this broad range of post-con-
ditions onto pre-conditions of other vulnerabilities to mo-
                                                           
2 Network Security Simulator (NeSSi2) –   www.nessi2.de  
3 Java-based Intelligent Agent Componentware (JIAC) – 
www.jiac.de  
4 oval.mitre.org  
del the chains of vulnerabilities and individual attacks 
which may result in a multi-step attack.  
4. INFORMATION EXTRACTION 
Information extraction (IE) deals with the automatic 
extraction of semantically meaningful units of informa-
tion from unstructured texts [29]. Two important subtasks 
of information extraction systems are entity and attribute 
extraction (e.g. software libraries, hardware products, 
services, version number, and patch level in the security 
context), and relation extraction, which is concerned with 
identifying relations between entities [28]. Storing and 
mapping extracted information to a knowledge base 
needs to consider the consistency and integrity of the col-
lected information [30]. Challenges arise also from the 
variability of natural language with respect to the synony-
my and ambiguity of words. 
Information extraction methods can be applied to extract 
meaningful pre- and post-conditions from the free-text 
descriptions available in vulnerability and threat data-
bases. A cursory analysis of these descriptions suggests 
that they follow semi-regularized patterns (vulnerability 
[X] in software [Y] allows [remote|local] attacker to 
[gain|execute|…] …) which can be learned, e.g. by 
applying a Conditional Random Field approach [31]. In 
this way, entities and their relations can be extracted and 
mapped onto instances of pre- and post-conditions pre-
defined in a knowledge base. The application of word and 
entity disambiguation methods [30], [32] will ensure that 
natural language variation is adequately handled. It will 
also ensure that novel concepts can be identified and used 
for ontology extension. 
5. ATTACK MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
A significant part of a network security testing comprise 
defining the attack vectors which  simply provide ordered 
lists of vulnerabilities and associated individual attacks.  
Attack modeling is an efficient way of representing the 
attack information in a structured and reusable form. 
These structures can be used in an automated solution to 
check security of an IT infrastructure. 
The attack tree is a formal concept introduced in [11] to 
model the threats to a system in a structured tree re-
presentation given with an attacker’s goal. In an attack 
tree the root node of the tree is the attacker’s overall goal 
and all the leaf nodes below any parent node represent the 
ways the attacker can use to accomplish the parent goal. 
The parent nodes may have single or multiple leaf nodes. 
If the former is the case then the achievement of the leaf 
node directly implies the achievement of the parent node; 
if the latter is the case the achievement of the parent node 
depends on the result of the logical operation (i.e. 
AND/OR) bounded with the leaf nodes. After having 
logically constructed the attack tree, each node can be 
assigned a continuous or a Boolean value. Attack trees 
with the assigned attributes can be converted to machine 
readable languages like XML and can be fed to several 
analysis tools [12], [13], [14]. However, there is no stan-
dard way of creating and storing these attack trees today. 
The creation of the attack trees heavily depends on the 
domain knowledge of the security experts.  
A Petri net is a bipartite graph consisting of places, 
transitions, and arcs in which places represent a state of 
the modeled system, transitions correspond to changes, 
and arcs determine the direction of the changes. Each 
place contains a set of tokens which moves among places 
when a transition state fires [15], [17]. An attack net is a 
disjunctive Petri net in which places represent the secu-
rity states of a system and transitions correspond to attac-
ker’s actions to compromise the system. The place of the 
tokens in the attack net shows the compromised set of 
places by the attacker. The advantage of using attack nets 
for attack modeling is the ability to conveniently re-
present the attack concurrency and progress with the mo-
vement of tokens, attacker’s actions as transitions, and 
the intermediate or final goals as places. Petri nets cannot 
scale well and building a well formed definite logic 
program with Petri nets has complexity of O(M3N) where 
M is the number of places and N is the number of tran-
sitions [16].  
Model Checking is a validation method to check whe-
ther a model M is consistent with the given property p or 
not. The model checker performs an exhaustive search on 
the model to find a counter-example which violates the 
given property.  Sheyner et al. [18] used model checking 
to generate attack graphs. In their approach the network is 
modeled as a finite state machine and each transition 
corresponds to an attacker’s action. The security policy of 
the system is defined as a property and the violation of 
the defined policy implies the existence of an attack path. 
The model checker tool NuSMV5 which stores each tran-
sition and state as a binary expression using Binary Deci-
sion Diagrams (BDD) is utilized to compute the attack 
graph. The severe drawback of the model checking ap-
proach is the state explosion problem which makes it in-
feasible to use for large size enterprise networks. Host-
centric model checking is introduced to overcome the 
state explosion problem [19]. By using the assumption 
that an attacker will never relinquish a state, attack graph 
generation is achieved in quadratic polynomial time.  
MIT-Lincoln-Lab showed in [20], [21] that the full at-
tack graph does not scale well. The number of the states 
in a full attack graph grows up to O(N!). They have sug-
gested two attack graphs namely Predictive Graph and 
Multiple-Prerequisite graph. The main idea behind these 
two attack graphs is to eliminate the redundant nodes. 
The assumption is that the attacker will exploit the vul-
nerability as long as it reaches to the vulnerable machine. 
The only two preconditions of a vulnerability considered 
in their approach is the locality (remote or local) of the 
attacker and the connectivity. The post-condition of vul-
nerability is categorized by four access levels: user, ad-
ministrative, DOS, and other.  
In the predictive graph a child node adds a vulnerability 
to the graph only if none of its ancestors already used the 
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vulnerability to reach the state before. The predictive 
graph scales with O(N2logN) in a network with no filte-
ring devices (e.g. firewall, router) and N hosts.  
The multiple-prerequisite (MP) graph introduces three 
different node types which represent the attacker’s access 
level, pre-conditions, and the vulnerabilities. The arcs 
have no content; they are simply associations between 
nodes. The three different arcs must point either from a 
state node to a condition, from a condition to a vulnera-
bility instance, and from a vulnerability instance to a state 
node. Ingols et al. in [20], [21] suggested the use of 
reachability groups instead of a reachability matrix. There 
is no need to compute the reachability of the nodes in the 
same subnet, since there are no filtering devices between 
them. Therefore the reachability matrix for a single 
subnet can be collapsed into a single group. A reach-
ability group dramatically reduces the time and memory 
needed to construct reachability information. The resul-
ting multi-prerequisite graph is also further simplified. 
The state nodes whose pre- and post- requisites are 
identical are collapsed into a single state group. Then the 
vulnerability instances, which have identical pre-re-
quisites, and the collapsed states forms a single vulne-
rability group. Given N nodes and E edges, the comple-
xity of proposed graph simplification algorithm becomes 
O(E + N logN). 
Client side vulnerabilities can be addressed by back-
wards reachability analysis. The assumption is that if 
there is a reverse path from the client side to the attack 
source then the client side vulnerability will be exploited. 
The modeling of host firewalls imposes a heavy burden 
on the reachability computation. This can be resolved by 
grouping the host firewalls which have similar rule sets.  
Logic-based attack modeling reveals the causal rela-
tionship between attack steps. Ou et al.’s approach for a 
scalable attack generation is inspired by an early model 
checking of the attack graph [25]. The entire network 
state is represented as a Boolean expression in each node.  
Each network configuration and attacker’s privileges are 
represented as a propositional formula. The technique is 
goal-oriented, i.e., the user has to specify a goal (e.g, 
execCode(attacker,workStation,root)) for the reasoning en-
gine to generate the attack graph realizing the specified 
goal.  Given a network with N machines the complexity 
of logic based attack graph is between O(N2) and O(N3).  
6. RISK MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY RE-
COMMENDATIONS 
Ingols et al. [20], [21] suggest a pretty straightforward 
recommendation algorithm in which they try to identify 
the vulnerabilities which lead to the largest number of 
host compromises. They identify their weighting metrics 
as the ratio of the non-compromised hosts over all com-
promised hosts after deployment of a patch. The attack 
graph is generated from scratch each time a recommen-
dation is tested. In addition, their recommendation algori-
thms do not take into account the organizational require-
ments, such as dependency between the services or the 
economical values of these services. They consider a 
worst case exploitation assumption and do not consider 
the CVSS6 impact values or exploitability metrics, such 
as the likelihood or complexity of an attack. 
Mehta et al. [26] use two different algorithms to rank and 
measure the probability of the existence of an attacker in 
each state over the attack graph. They adopt Google’s 
PageRank algorithm and apply it with some minor chan-
ges. Sawilla et al. [27] applied Google’s PageRank al-
gorithm to identify most realistic and easiest attack vec-
tors. The authors used a variety of weighting metrics to 
measure the criticality of attacks by considering the 
likelihood and complexity of an attack, the availability of 
an exploit, and the relative significance of a network asset. 
The former two metrics are taken from publicly available 
CVSS database, but the latter varies from one 
organization to another and the network administrators 
have to assign asset values.  
The objective of the recommendation algorithms is to 
combat with the identified attack scenarios in the most 
cost–effective manner. For this purpose, complex depen-
dencies between assets and processes in an IT infra-
structure should be taken into consideration. We adapt a 
business process-oriented approach where risk assess-
ment, vulnerability assessment, and risk mitigation are in-
tegrated into a quantitative framework [22]. By using the 
asset dependencies, business process values can be map-
ped onto IT hardware components in a hierarchical man-
ner. These mappings should also consider the problem of 
uncertainty which means that there will never be perfect 
knowledge about the IT infrastructure, since neither 
inventory systems nor tools can reliably provide the 
current state. These mappings can be combined with the 
IT system vulnerability and attack analysis to derive risk 
scores on a network node level. 
7. SECURITY SIMULATION 
Existing tools that support security evaluation with simu-
lation are rare and usually focused on specific problems. 
Wei et al. [23] focus on epidemiological models of worm 
propagation and developed for this a distributed simu-
lation tool. Another example is Liljenstam et al. [24], 
they describe in their work the simulation tool RINSE. 
The focus of their tool is to create distributed simulation 
environment that is capable to interact with human during 
a simulation and allow them to issue commands. The 
intended use of the tool is security related education and 
security related exercises, like LÜKEX 2011. During this 
nation-wide crisis management exercise governmental 
organizations will test how well they are prepared against 
large-scale cyber-attacks against national IT infrastruc-
tures. Exercises like LÜKEX7 2011 are time consuming 
and costly. In the end they only reflect the state on certain 
point in time.  
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In our approach a data gathering agent exists that creates 
a model of the IT infrastructure to be tested. This agent 
combines several components for the actual data ga-
thering. These components include: network scanners, 
database connectors, and correlation components. Net-
work scanners actively try to collect information about 
the network topology, e.g. by wrapping nmap8. Database 
connectors can connect to an inventory system of a com-
pany and retrieve the stored information. Finally the cor-
relation component combines output and creates the topo-
logy. This can then be modified by a system adminis-
trator to resolve conflicts or to add missing components. 
Based on the information about the network topology, the 
applications on network nodes, and the data available 
from vulnerability database, it is possible to construct a 
description of possible attack vectors on assets of the 
target organization. This is similar to work described by 
Foo et al. [7]. In contrast, it is not used for intrusion 
response purposes in running systems, but for calculating 
risks for the organization, planning and performing secu-
rity tests, and evaluating different protection approaches, 
either preventive or responsive. 
8. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
Our approach is based on a multi-agent system. The main 
reason for this is the distributed nature of the problem 
and the requirement of continuous autonomous operation. 
Basically, our system will consist of multiple agents for 
the steps in an autonomous control loop (see, for example, 
Huebscher and McCann [33]). These agents all have their 
specific tasks and goals and contribute to the overall goal 
of continuous security testing and reporting. One main 
concern in developing the multi-agent system are the 
security requirements of the system itself, since it re-
quires sharing of sensitive data between agents running in 
a distributed environment which may be controlled by 
different organization units. In this context sensitive data 
are any data that fall in the area of regulated by privacy 
laws, organizational confidentiality, and secrecy require-
ments. This can be addressed by two approaches. First, 
by using distributed algorithms that do not require sen-
sitive data, e.g. during the risk analysis only values of 
assets need to be communicated but no information that 
could be used to identify assets. Alternatively, data 
collection agents preprocess data before sharing. This 
preprocessing makes the data anonymous or pseudo-
nymous. Anonymization guarantees a higher degree of 
privacy and secrecy, but pseudomization is more useful 
in case of incident handling, since authorized stuff can 
recover the original values. 
9. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we presented an open source software 
framework for automated identification of possible attack 
scenarios in IT infrastructures by using public vulnera-
bility and exploit databases. We are planning to exploit 
our current results in the multi-agent systems (JIAC), 
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security simulation (NeSSi2), risk management, attack 
analysis, and intrusion response. Based on our literature 
review, further activities are required in research points: 
(i) automatic and semi-automatic information extraction 
methods, (ii) distributed approaches for attack analysis 
for complex and large scale IT infrastructures, (iii) 
quantitative risk analysis, (iv) recommendations based on 
assets and processes in IT infrastructure, (v) security 
simulation for analysis of different mitigation scenarios, 
and (vi) usability, scalability and extensibility of the 
framework.  
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